feat(mcp): OAuth 2.1 + PKCE for outbound MCP servers

[waleedlatif1]

Summary

• Adds spec-compliant OAuth 2.1 + PKCE support for outbound MCP servers via the SDK's OAuthClientProvider
• Auto-detects OAuth requirement on server create via unauthenticated probe (WWW-Authenticate / oauth-protected-resource)
• Persists per-user-per-server tokens (encrypted) in new mcp_server_oauth table; SDK refreshes automatically before expiry
• Popup-based consent flow (/api/mcp/oauth/start → /api/mcp/oauth/callback) with state CSRF protection
• Pre-registered OAuth client support (Client ID + Secret in Advanced settings) for servers without RFC 7591 DCR
• Surfaces reauth_required from tool execution when refresh token is invalid so the UI can prompt to reconnect

Type of Change

• New feature

Testing

Tested manually against OAuth-protected MCP servers (Linear). Existing header-auth servers regression-checked.

Checklist

• Code follows project style guidelines
• Self-reviewed my changes
• Tests added/updated and passing
• No new warnings introduced
• I confirm that I have read and agree to the terms outlined in the Contributor License Agreement (CLA)

[vercel]

The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
docs	Error		May 10, 2026 7:51pm

[cursor]

PR Summary

High Risk
Adds an OAuth consent flow and encrypted token storage for outbound MCP connections, and changes how tools are executed/discovered across server auth modes; mistakes here can break integrations or expose auth edge cases. Also introduces new DB tables/columns and per-user connection scoping, increasing rollout risk.

Overview
Enables outbound MCP servers to authenticate via OAuth 2.1 + PKCE (in addition to header/none auth), including auto-probing server auth requirements and a popup-based consent flow.

Adds new /api/mcp/oauth/start and /api/mcp/oauth/callback routes plus an SDK OAuthClientProvider implementation that persists per-user OAuth state (client info, tokens, PKCE verifier/state) in a new encrypted mcp_server_oauth table; callback burns state and refreshes discovered tools.

Extends MCP server CRUD to store authType and optional pre-registered oauthClientId/oauthClientSecret (encrypted), hides secrets via hasOauthClientSecret, and clears per-user OAuth rows when URL/credentials change. Updates tool execution/discovery and the persistent connection manager to attach OAuth providers, scope managed connections by (serverId,userId), and return a 401 reauth_required when OAuth is missing/expired so the UI can prompt reconnect.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit aa8078d. Configure here.}

[greptile-apps]

Greptile Summary

This PR implements full OAuth 2.1 + PKCE support for outbound MCP servers, introducing a mcp_server_oauth DB table for per-user encrypted token storage, a SimMcpOauthProvider that drives the SDK's standard auth flow, and a popup-based consent UI (/api/mcp/oauth/start → /api/mcp/oauth/callback). Several security issues found in earlier review passes have all been addressed in subsequent commits.

• New OAuth infrastructure: mcp_server_oauth table, SimMcpOauthProvider, encrypted storage helpers, and probe-based authType auto-detection are wired together coherently; connection-manager cache keys are correctly scoped per-user for OAuth servers.
• reauth_required propagation: Tool execution surfaces a structured { code: 'reauth_required', serverId } response for all OAuth error types, and both discoverServerTools and getServerSummaries mark expired-token servers as disconnected rather than error.
• Remaining minor concerns: The state-lifetime TTL in loadOauthRowByState is driven by updatedAt which any row write can bump, and the form modal's connection-test bypass heuristic is broader than necessary.

Confidence Score: 5/5

Safe to merge; OAuth plumbing is well-structured, all previously identified security gaps are closed, and remaining findings are minor hardening suggestions that do not affect correctness or security of the happy path.

All significant issues from prior review rounds are confirmed addressed. The two new findings are narrow: state TTL via updatedAt is low-risk because states are single-use, and the form modal auth-bypass heuristic affects only the UX guard, not the server-side security boundary.

apps/sim/lib/mcp/oauth/storage.ts (state TTL via updatedAt) and the mcp-server-form-modal.tsx (connection-test bypass heuristic) would benefit from a follow-up hardening pass.

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
apps/sim/lib/mcp/oauth/storage.ts	New file for DB persistence of MCP OAuth state; tokens and client info are encrypted correctly, PKCE verifier is encrypted, state stored as SHA-256 hash. Minor: loadOauthRowByState TTL driven by updatedAt which unrelated row writes can bump.
apps/sim/lib/mcp/oauth/provider.ts	New SimMcpOauthProvider correctly implements OAuthClientProvider, delegates to encrypted storage helpers, supports both pre-registered and DCR clients.
apps/sim/app/api/mcp/oauth/callback/route.ts	Burns state before token exchange, validates session user matches flow initiator, HTML-escapes all reflected values, uses postMessage with same-origin check.
apps/sim/app/api/mcp/oauth/start/route.ts	Correctly uses withMcpAuth middleware, validates server authType, surfaces authorization URL via McpOauthRedirectRequired signal.
apps/sim/app/api/mcp/servers/route.ts	POST handler probes new/URL-changed servers and preserves existing authType on same-URL edits; OAuth token cleanup correctly added to upsert transaction.
apps/sim/app/api/mcp/servers/[id]/route.ts	PATCH handler wrapped in transaction, clears mcp_server_oauth when URL or OAuth credentials change, strips raw secret from response.
apps/sim/app/api/mcp/tools/execute/route.ts	Correctly catches all OAuth error types returning structured reauth_required response with correct serverId; timeout handle properly cleared.
apps/sim/lib/mcp/service.ts	Threads userId into createClient for OAuth servers; discoverServerTools and getServerSummaries handle UnauthorizedError and McpOauthAuthorizationRequiredError by marking servers disconnected.
apps/sim/lib/mcp/connection-manager.ts	Cache keys correctly scoped per-user for OAuth servers; disconnectServer removes all per-user connections for a given server ID.
apps/sim/hooks/mcp/use-mcp-oauth-popup.ts	Per-server connecting state tracked in a Set; setInterval polling cleaned up on unmount; postMessage origin check enforced.
apps/sim/hooks/queries/mcp.ts	Query key structure refactored for hierarchical invalidation; useStartMcpOauth validates https scheme with localhost loopback exception before opening popup.
packages/db/schema.ts	New mcp_server_oauth table with correct FK cascades, unique index on (mcpServerId, userId), and state lookup index.
apps/sim/app/workspace/[workspaceId]/settings/components/mcp/components/mcp-server-form-modal/mcp-server-form-modal.tsx	OAuth fields added with secretTouched tracking; connection test bypass heuristic is overly broad and could allow saving misconfigured header-auth servers.

Sequence Diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant UI as Browser/UI
    participant Start as /api/mcp/oauth/start
    participant CB as /api/mcp/oauth/callback
    participant DB as mcp_server_oauth
    participant AS as Auth Server MCP

    UI->>+Start: GET with serverId and workspaceId
    Start->>DB: getOrCreateOauthRow
    DB-->>Start: oauth row
    Start->>AS: SDK mcpAuth metadata discovery plus DCR
    AS-->>Start: McpOauthRedirectRequired
    Start-->>-UI: status redirect with authorizationUrl

    UI->>UI: window.open authorizationUrl
    AS-->>UI: redirect to callback with auth code and state

    UI->>+CB: GET callback
    CB->>DB: loadOauthRowByState hash lookup with TTL
    DB-->>CB: oauth row
    CB->>DB: clearState burn before exchange
    CB->>AS: SDK mcpAuth token exchange
    AS-->>CB: access and refresh tokens
    CB->>DB: saveTokens encrypted
    CB->>DB: clearVerifier
    CB-->>-UI: postMessage ok true

Loading

_{Reviews (24): Last reviewed commit: "fix(mcp): final audit fixes — state TTL,..." | Re-trigger Greptile}

[waleedlatif1]

Greptile summary findings addressed in f587e82:

• Edit modal drops existing OAuth Client ID: editInitialData now includes oauthClientId; the API already returns it (only the secret is masked) so the field populates and Advanced auto-expands.
• Shared OAuth mutation disables all buttons: per-server pending tracked in a local Set<string>; the spinner is scoped to the card whose flow is in progress.
• Plaintext PKCE codeVerifier: now encrypted at rest via encryptSecret to match tokens/clientInformation.

The point about clearing a pre-registered Client ID by emptying the field is a follow-up — oauthClientId || undefined collapses an intentional clear into a no-op. Will tackle when adding TTL cleanup for abandoned OAuth sessions.

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[cursor]

✅ Bugbot reviewed your changes and found no new issues!

Comment @cursor review or bugbot run to trigger another review on this PR

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 3f840d6. Configure here.}

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@greptile

[waleedlatif1]

@cursor review

[cursor]

✅ Bugbot reviewed your changes and found no new issues!

Comment @cursor review or bugbot run to trigger another review on this PR

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit aa8078d. Configure here.}